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VIRGINIA SECTION 
THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAvV 
CONTRACTS AND SALES 
Joseph Curtis* 
RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
The Uniform Commercial Code, which was enacted in the 1964 legis-
lative session and which became effective in Virginia on January 1, 1966, 
provided enough changes in the substantive law of contracts and sales 
to occupy the Virginia bar for a long time to come. The General Assem-
bly may well have been conscious of this in promulgating few substantive 
enactments in this area in the 1966 regular session. 
The bulk of the statutory provisions emanating from this session were 
directed at conforming previously existing Code sections \vith the new 
Uniform Commercial Code. Thus Code section 11-1, declaring certain 
oral contracts void as to creditors and purchasers, was amended to pro-
vide that if the contract or bill of sale creates a security interest as de-
fined in the Uniform Commercial Code, its validity should be governed 
by the UCC.1 Similarly, the validity of certain recorded contracts as 
against creditors and purchasers, which had been governed by Code 
section 55-95 is now to be controlled by the pertinent UCC sections if 
the contract creates a security interest as contemplated by the UCC.2 
Numerous other such amendments were made to give decisive effect 
to the UCC provisions where they might otherwise conflict with pre-
UCC applications of the older Code sections.3 
Also worthy of note is new Code section 11-20.14 which permits a 
preference to be accorded to a resident bidder on a public contract when 
the home state laws of a lower nonresident bidder would allow such 
a preference to its residents. 
CoNTRAcrs 
Broker's Right to Commission for Unconsummated Sale 
In Reiber v. ]ames M. Duncan, ]r. & Associates> the Supreme Court 
"Dean and Professor of Jurisprudence, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College 
of William & Mary. B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LLM., 1948, New York University. 
1 VA. CoDE ANN.§ 11-1 (Supp.l966). 
2 VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-95 (Supp. 1966). 
3 See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 8.9-302 & 55-96 (Supp. 1966). 
4 VA. CoDE ANN.§ 11-20.1 (Supp. 1966). 
5206Va.657, 145 S.E.2d 157 (1965). 
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of Appeals applied the general rule that a broker is entitled to his com-
mission upon procuring a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy a 
listed property on the owner's terms even though the sale is not con-
summated, unless the failure of the transaction is the fault of the broker. 
The Court held the rule controlling notwithstanding ( 1) that the de-
fendant's wife, whose signature was necessary to convey the absolute 
title to the property, had not joined in either the listing agreement or 
the contract of sale, since the defendant was indebted to the agent for 
personal services rendered regardless of his interest in the property; (2) 
that there was a delay in settlement, since time was not of essence in 
the contract; (3) that the sale was contingent upon inspections of the 
property by the purchasers and the city inspector, since the contingency 
was wholly for the benefit of the purchasers and the evidence indicated 
either that the inspections had been made or that the purchasers had 
waived their right thereto; and (4) that no tender of payment had been 
made by the purchasers, since the defendant had already made it known 
before the settlement date had been fixed that he was not going to con-
summate the sale. 
Commission Denied Because of Agent's Conflict of Interest 
An agent authorized to sell may not sell to himself, except with full 
knowledge and consent of his principal, regardless whether the agent 
pays the price fixed by the principal or as much or more than anyone 
else would pay.6 In Bell v. Routh Robbins Real Estate Corp.,7 an action 
by the seller to recover the commission paid to the agent, the trial court 
found that although there were many respects in which the agent was 
closely associated with the purchaser, there was no breach of his duty 
to the seller since none of the ties between the agent and the purchaser 
gave the agent an interest in the subject property or an ownership 
interest in the buyer corporation. The Supreme Court of Appeals, re-
versing and rendering final judgment for the plaintiff seller, held that the 
agent's duty of loyalty to the seller-principal demanded more than a 
mere absence a concealed ownership interest in the buying entity. In 
Bell the subagent, who was acting in the transaction for the agent real 
estate corporation, was one of the signatories to the buyer's articles of 
incorporation, had participated in the initial incorporation meeting and 
in the election of the buyer's directors, was elected a director and vice-
president of the buyer, and could expect to earn a subsequent commis-
sion upon resale of the property by the buyer.8 The nondisclosure of 
6See MECHEM, AGENCY§§ 504-07 (4th ed. 1952). 
7 206 Va. 853, 147 SE.2d 277 (1966). 
s Although the defendant real estate corporation had no knowledge of its subagent's 
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the agent's substantial interest in the consummation of the sale to the 
buyer corporation was in the Court's view as much a breach of the 
agent's fiduciary duty to the seller as his nondisclosure of a personal 
ownership interest in the buyer corporation would have been. 
Contract Voidable When Agent Acts for Both Parties 
Without Thei1· Knowledge 
In P1·ice v. Martin9 a vendor sued for a declaratory judgment to void 
a contract of sale of real property and to enjoin the purchaser from 
asserting any rights thereunder. The agent involved in the case had, at 
the request of a prospective purchaser on a previous occasion, asked the 
plaintiff if she was interested in selling certain property. Although the 
plaintiff expressed an interest in selling this property, the price offered 
was apparently too low, and no sale was accomplished as the result of 
this conversation. Moreover, the plaintiff declined the agent's invitation 
to place her property on his list. Subsequently, the defendant contacted 
the agent about the possibility of purchasing the plaintiff's property, and 
the agent obtained the plaintiff's agreement to sell the property to the 
purchaser at a price satisfactory to both parties. This agreement was made 
subject to a condition, attached by the plaintiff, that a third party was to 
have the right of first refusal, but the printed sales contract did not recite 
this condition, nor did the agent inform the defendant of it when he pre-
sented the contract for the defendant's signature. When the third party 
accepted the plaintiff's offer, the question of the defendant's rights in the 
property arose, and the declaratory judgment action was instituted. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment entered in favor 
of the plaintiff vendor. The apparent ground for the decision was that 
although the defendant had no actual knowledge of the condition to 
the sale, the knowledge of the real estate broker, who unquestionably 
was the defendant's agent, was imputed to the defendant. However, 
the decision is not entirely clear and contains language which seems to 
suggest an alternative holding that the contract of sale was voidable be-
cause the real estate broker was acting as the agent of both parties without 
their intelligent consent. It appears from the statement of facts that the 
Court justifiably found that the broker did become the agent of the vendor 
as well as of the purchaser during the course of the transaction, because the 
printed provision of the sales contract stated that the purchaser should make 
the down payment to the broker as the agent for the vendor and because 
connections with the buyer-corporation, the Coutt said that under familiar agency prin-
ciples the defendant's right to retain the commission could rise no higher than the right 
of its subagent, who was acting within the scope of his employment. Id. at 861, 147 
S.E.2d at 282. 
9 207 Va. 86, 147 S.E.2d 716 (1966). 
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the vendor agreed to pay the broker his commission. However, it also 
appears that both parties were quite aware that the broker was acting as 
the agent for both parties. Thus it is submitted that the firmer ground 
for the Court's decision is that the agent's knowledge of the condition 
to the sales contract should be imputed to the defendant as one of the 
agent's principals. 
Ambiguity Resolved Against One Who Creates It 
The question presented in Graham v. Commonwealth10 was whether 
the plaintiff contractor was entitled to immediate payment of fifteen 
dollars per cubic yard for certain extra excavation work which it per-
formed, or whether the amount of payment was still open to negotiation 
between the parties. Several different parts of the contract, which were 
in apparent conflict, were relevant to this issue. The specifications pro-
vided that "any additional excavation and fill will be paid for in accord-
ance with unit prices agreed upon." Seemingly the prices referred to in 
this clause were set in the "Form of Agreement," which stated that the unit 
price for any change in the work was to be fifteen dollars per cubic 
yard. However, the "General Conditions" provided that the defendant 
should have a choice between three methods of paying the plaintiff for 
extra work. The second method set forth was to estimate "the number 
of unit quantities" and to multiply this number "by the applicable unit 
price (if any) set forth in the contract or other mutually agreed unit 
price." The defendant contended, and the lower court held, that this 
provision in the General Conditions section was not inconsistent with the 
specifications clause and the Form of Agreement, and that the price set 
in the Form of Agreement was merely one method of payment which 
the defendant could follow at its option. Support for this position was 
drawn from the fact that the General Conditions provision mentioned 
not only a "unit price ... set forth in the contract," which presumably 
referred to the price set forth in the Form of Agreement, but also an 
"other mutually agreed unit price." Thus it was argued that the de-
fendant was free to choose under the contract to pay either the fifteen 
dollars per cubic yard or to negotiate a new price. The defendant sought 
to reconcile this interpretation '\vith the specifications clause by arguing 
that that clause should be read to mean "unit prices [to be] agreed upon." 
The Supreme Court of Appeals did not accept this reasoning, but concluded 
that the language of the specifications clause was clear and that its 
plain meaning should not be changed by inserting the words "to be" as 
the defendant urged. Thus the Court held that the specifications clause 
referred to the price set forth in the Form of Agreement and that the 
1o 206 Va. 431, 143 S.E.2d 831 (196;). 
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plaintiff was entitled to a payment based upon this figure. Supporting 
the Court's position was a provision in the contract which stated that in 
the event of conflict the specifications clause should take precedence over 
the General Conditions, and the Form of Agreement should take prece-
dence over both the specifications clause and the General Conditions. 
Moreover, the Court relied upon the proposition that an ambiguity in 
a contract is to be strictly construed against the party who wrote the 
contract. 
Tlus latter principle was also applied by the Court in Hutchison v. 
King.U The issue presented in that case was whether the obligation of a 
subcontractor was to place sod "to the satisfaction of the Contracting 
Officer," or whether the work had to be "accepted by the Engineers [for 
payment by the Federal Aviation Agency]." If the former interpretation 
were to prevail, since the sod had been placed with approval of the 
contracting officer, the subcontractor-plaintiff would not be responsible 
for subsequent maintenance and the washing away of the sod in later 
storms. However, if the subcontractor's work had to be accepted in the 
same manner as for payment by the Agency, the loss of the sod in the 
wash of the storms would have to be borne by the plaintiff since that 
condition had not been met. The lower court gave to the defendant's 
letter confirnling the oral agreement the latter construction and entered 
judgment for the defendant. In reversing and rendering final judgment 
for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Appeals could find no justification 
for implying the bracketed term, and furthermore noted that even if the 
provisions were ambiguous, they must be construed against the defendant, 
who wrote the confirming letter. Also of note is the Court's holding that 
it was not bound by the trial judge's interpretation of the intent of the 
confirnling letter. 
Effect of a Seal on Revocability 
In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Cox12 the Supreme Court of Appeals 
was presented with the question whether a seal is sufficient, in the 
absence of any other consideration, to preclude the revocation of an 
offer. In this case the lessor executed under seal an indenture lease agree-
ment. The agreement was then given to an agent of the lessee for 
processing and, if it was approved, the signature of the lessee. However, 
before he signed the instrument, the lessee was informed by the lessor 
that the offer was cancelled. The lessee nevertheless signed the lease 
agreement and sought to hold the lessor to its terms, alleging that since 
the offer was executed under seal it was an irrevocable option. The 
11206 Va. 619, 145 S.E.2d 216 (1965). 
12 207 Va. 197, 148 S.E.2d 756 (1966). 
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Supreme Court of Appeals aclmowledged that in Watkins v. Robertson13 
it had held that an offer was made binding by the mere presence of a 
seal. However, the Court distinguished Watkins from the case before it 
on the ground that whereas the instrument in Watkins had been intended 
to operate as an option, the one which it was presently considering was 
intended to be a bilateral contract imposing mutual rights and obliga-
tions. Thus, the Court reasoned, the rule that an option is made irrev-
ocable by a seal was not applicable since it was not an option contract 
which was in issue. The Court pointed out that to hold that the lessor was 
precluded from revoking his offer because he signed the lease agreement 
under seal would be "to enforce an implied promise that was never 
intended by giving to a seal an effect that was never intended." 14 
Accordingly, the Court held that the lessor had justifiably cancelled his 
offer before it had been accepted, and that he was therefore not bound 
by the lease agreement. 
Liability on Contractor's Payment Bond 
Noland Co. v. West End Realty Corp.15 involved the question whether 
a contractor and its surety were liable on their bond to the plaintiff for 
payment for materials which the la~er had supplied to a subcontractor. 
The contractor had previously paid the subcontractor in full, but the 
subcontractor was adjudicated bankrupt before the plaintiff collected 
from him. The plaintiff cited to the Court cases in which it was held 
that liability on a bond is not extinguished by the fact that the general 
contractor has paid to the subcontractor the full subcontract price. These 
cases were not themselves dispositive, however, since, as the defendants 
contended, they were distinguishable on the ground that in the instant 
case the defendant-contractor had paid to his subcontractors, who were 
within the class of persons who could be claimants under the bond, 
a total in excess of the amount of the bond. The Court aclmowledged 
that the defendants' liability on the bond could be no greater than the 
sum of the bond. Thus the question was narrowed to whether the de-
fendants' liability on the bond was extinguished simply by payment to 
potential claimants under the bond of an amount in excess of the sum 
of the bond or whether their liability on the bond could be extinguished 
only by payment of claims actually made pursuant to the bond. In 
holding that the defendants' liability had not been extinguished, the 
Court followed the general rule that an obligation on a bond is inde-
pendent of the contractor's liability to his subcontractors, because it is 
13105 Va. 269, 54 S.E. 33 (1906). 
14 207 Va. at 202, 148 SE.2d at 760. 
15 206 Va. 938, 147 S.E.2d 105 (1966). 
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derived from the contract between the contractor, the surety and the 
owner of the project, and not from the subcontract itself. The Court 
found crucial for its decision a provision in the bond which stated that 
"payment by Surety of mechanics' liens . . . , whether or not claim for 
the amount of such lien be presented under and against this bond" 
would reduce the amount of the bond. The Court reasoned that the 
singling out of the payment of mechanics' liens in this manner clearly im-
plied that payment of claims other than mechanics' liens would reduce the 
amount of the bond only if the claims were :filed against the bond. 
SALES 
Processor's Implied Warranty Not Terminated by the Fact 
That Retailer Has Opened Package 
The landmark 1959 case of Swift & Co. v. W ells16 linked Virginia 
\vith the increasing number of jurisdictions which have eliminated the 
requirement of privity in a consumer's action for breach of an implied 
warranty of :fitness for human consumption against a remote seller of 
foodstuffs. In Brockett v. Harrell Bros.,U decided during the past term, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals was confronted \vith a situation which was 
distinguishable from Swift on the ground that the defective product had 
not been sold in a sealed package, but had been handled direcdy by the 
retailer before being sold to the plaintiff. The Court recognized that in 
an action against a remote seller or the manufacturer the plaintiff might 
have more difficulty in proving that the goods were defective before 
being placed in the hands of the retailer if the retailer has opened the 
package than if the package has remained sealed. However, the Court 
held that the trial court had erred in striking the plaintiff's evidence relating 
to the implied warranty of a remote seller, because the question whether 
the goods were defective when they left the hands of this seller was one 
for the jury. It is to be noted that the Court was not required to extend 
the doctrine of Swift in making its decision since in 1962 the General 
Assembly enacted a statute which eliminated lack of privity as a defense 
in all actions for breach of warranty.18 
In Brockett the Court also discussed the question whether contribu-
tory negligence is a defense to an action for breach of warranty. Ac-
knowledging the conflict of authority on this issue, the Court stated that 
since a warranty action is ex contractu, the contributory negligence of 
the plaintiff is not material. However, the Court took care to note that 
16 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959). 
17 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965). 
18 See VA. ConE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965). 
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"if the condition of the ham of which the plaintiff complains was known, 
visible or obvious to her, there was no liability on an implied warranty 
of fitness . . .. " 19 This language appears to suggest that assumption of 
risk can be a defense to a warranty action. On the other hand, the Court 
seemed to limit the availability of assumption of risk as a defense by 
rationalizing the doctrine in contract terms. Thus the Court stated that 
the reason that the plaintiff could not recover for breach of warranty if 
she had known of the existence of the defect was that "the presumption 
is that the plaintiff contracted to buy this food product in its obvious 
or known condition." 20 If this is in fact the rationale of the rule, it 
would appear that the defense could not be invoked in the situation 
where an injured consumer has bought a defective product concealed in 
a closed package and later, before using the product, discovers the de-
fect. Although such a result would preserve the conceptual integrity 
of a warranty action as ex contractu, it would seem to be otherwise un-
justifiable. 
RestaurateU1· Sells Food With Implied Warranty 
Another case decided this term involving the implied warranty of 
fitness in the sale of foods was Levy v. Paul.21 The only question before 
the Supreme Court of Appeals in that case was whether a restaurateur is 
deemed to "sell" food for the purpose of determining whether he im-
pliedly warrants its fitness for human consumption. A substantial minor-
ity of jurisdictions have held that a restaurant proprietor only utters food 
and that no warranty attaches since the transaction with the consumer 
does not constitute a sale.22 There was some reason to believe that 
Virginia would align itself with this minority in view of the holding of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals in O'Connor v. Smith23 that a restaurateur 
does not buy and sell merchandise so as to come within the scope of 
the Bulk Sales Act.24 However, the Court held in the instant case that 
whatever might be the status of the restaurant business for purposes 
of the Bulk Sales Act, 25 there is no good reason to hold that the serving 
of food and drink by a restaurateur is not a sale for purposes of the 
19 206 Va. at 463, 143 SE.2d at 902. 
2o Ibid. 
21201 Va. 100, 147 S.E.2d 722 (1966). 
22See, e.g., Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 Atl. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 
1927); Walton v. Guthrie, 50 Tenn. App. 383, 362 S.W.2d 41 (1962). 
23188 Va. 214, 49 SE.2d 310 (1948). 
24 Va. Code Ann. § 55-83 (1959). This statute was repealed as of January 1, 1966, 
and replaced by the UCC provisions on bulk transfers. See VA. ConE ANN. §§ 8.6-
101 to -111 (1965). 
25 It is to be noted that the restaurant business is still excluded from the 
coverage of the bulk transfer law. See VA. ConE ANN. § 8.6-102, comment 2 (1965). 
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law of warranty. Accordingly, it reversed the lower court which had 
sustained the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff consumer's motion for 
judgment. It is to be noted that the question raised by Levy is moot as 
to any transaction arising after January 1, 1966, the effective date in 
Virginia of the Uniform Commercial Code, which expressly brings within 
the scope of the implied warranty of merchantability "the serving for 
value of food or drink to be consumed . . . on the premises. . . ." 26 
Proof of Damages on Breach of Implied Warranty 
Still another aspect of the law of implied warranties of quality in 
sales transactions was considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals in 
Holz v. Coates Motor Co.21 This case involved the plaintiff's burden 
to establish his damages in a warranty action. It was not disputed that 
the measure of damages was the difference between the value of the 
goods sold with and >vithout the defect warranted against. The Court 
stated that the sales price of the product in question could be taken as 
the value of the product >vithout defects, but that there must be some 
evidence submitted as to the value of the product >vith its alleged defects.28 
Since the plaintiff had submitted no such evidence, the Court affirmed 
the trial court's action in setting aside the jury's verdict against the manu-
facturer. In dictum, however, the Court noted that the plaintiff could 
have avoided this burden of proof by electing the alternative remedy of 
rescission. 
State Statute Gives Federal Court a "Long-Arm" 
In Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Manufacturing Co.29 a federal district court 
upheld the paragraph of Virginia's "long-arm" statute30 encompassing ac-
tions for breach of warranty. The court first found that the personal 
jurisdiction conferred by the statute extended to the federal courts. It 
then held that the application of the statute does not deny the defendant 
due process of law, even when it is applied retroactively to cover a 
cause of action which arose before the statute became effective. 
Regarding the federal jurisdiction question, whatever conflict there may 
once have been regarding the use by a federal court of a state long-arm 
26 VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.2-314(1) (1965). 
27206 Va. 894,147 S.E.2d 152 (1966). 
28 The plaintiff attempted to prove that the defect was such as to render the 
automobile in question totally valueless in order to bring his case within the ambit 
of such cases as Gerder v. Bowling, 202 Va. 213, 116 S.E.2d 268 (1960). The Court, 
however, discredited the plaintiff's statement that the car was valueless in light of the 
fact that it had been driven more than 8,000 miles within twelve months. 
29 249 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1965). 
30 VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-81.2 (5) (Supp. 1966). 
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statute is now resolved by new federal rule 4(e),31 which expressly 
authorizes service of federal process in the manner prescribed by a state 
statute directed at service on nonresidents. On the issue of constitu-
tionality, the court found that the Virginia provision relating to breach 
of warranty, which provides for service on a defendant who has engaged 
"regularly" in "persistent" conduct within the state, was similar in scope 
to the Washington statute which was upheld by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.32 Moreover, the 
court pointed out that there is strong indication that the Supreme Court 
would uphold the constitutionality of a "single-act" provision in a long-
arm statute,33 which leads a fortiori to the conclusion that Virginia's 
breach of warranty provision is valid. The retroactive application of 
the statute raised a more serious constitutional problem, but the court 
held that since the Virginia statute was intended to be procedural 
and since a party has no vested rights in matters of procedure, such 
application of the statute was not unconstitutional. However, the court 
stated that there was a "substantial ground for difference of opinion" on 
this issue, and therefore granted the defendant a right to an immediate 
appeal from the order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
31 FED. R. c.v. P. 4(e). 
32 326 u.s. 310 (1945). 
33 249 F. Supp. at 5. In support of this statement the court cited Rosenblatt v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1 (Goldberg, Circuit Justice, 1965), in which 
an application for a stay of judgment pending appeal from a decision of the New 
York Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's denial of the defendant's pre-
trial motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction was denied. 
In that case Mr. Justice Goldberg concluded that the defendant's argument against 
the constitutionality of a provision in New York's long-arm statute conferring 
jurisdiction on the basis of the commission of a tortious act was insubstantial. 
